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Pros
Unconditional basic income can redistribute the 
benefits from automation and globalization.
Since it is not conditional on income, unconditional 
basic income does not create “poverty traps.”
Unconditional basic income is simple and 
transparent, with low administrative costs.
Unconditional basic income is an efficient buffer 
against shocks and systemic risks from automation 
and globalization.
Some evidence from experimental studies suggests 
that unconditional basic income might have 
positive effects on labor supply and education and 
occupation choices.
ElEVAToR PiTCH
Automation and globalization have brought about a 
tremendous increase in productivity, but also accelerated job 
destruction, systemic risks, and greater income inequality. 
Current social policies may not be adequate for achieving 
the goals of redistributing the gains from automation and 
globalization, providing efficient buffers against economic 
shocks, and advancing the reallocation of jobs and skills. 
Under certain circumstances, an unconditional basic 
income might be a better alternative for achieving those 
goals. It is simple, transparent, and has low administrative 
costs, though it may require higher taxes.
AUTHoR’S mAin mESSAgE
Economic reasoning and empirical evidence suggest that, under certain conditions, unconditional basic income might be 
an important policy innovation for redistributing the gains from automation and globalization, building a buffer against 
shocks and systemic risks, and generating positive labor supply incentives among poor people. While an unconditional basic 
income policy is simple and transparent, with low administration costs, financing it might require higher taxes. Although the 
evidence on implied efficiency losses is mixed, carefully designed taxes can avoid the risk of canceling the potential benefits of 
unconditional basic income through efficiency losses.
Cons
Unconditional basic income is very costly to 
implement and requires higher taxes to finance it.
Microsimulation studies suggest that unconditional 
basic income might reduce labor supply because of 
the income effect of the transfer and the substitution 
effect of the higher taxes needed to finance the 
transfer.
Unconditional basic income might lead to a 
reduction in effort, motivation, and autonomy.
Unconditional basic income also benefits the 
“undeserving.”
is unconditional basic income a viable alternative to 
other social welfare measures?
Countries give basic education and health care to everyone, and for good 
reasons—why not basic income?
Keywords: basic income, means testing, incentives, redistribution, globalization, automation
KEY FinDingS
Source: Author’s analysis of data from the US Census and World Top
Income Database. Online at: topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.
eu/#Database.
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moTiVATion
High unemployment and job insecurity are in part a consequence of the Great Recession 
following the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009. More fundamentally, however, 
they are a byproduct of automation and globalization. Along with large potential gains, 
these processes bring massive dislocations, including job losses, shocks, and systemic risks 
(see Automation, globalization, and basic income). There is evidence that the gains from 
automation and globalization end up in just a few hands and are likely smaller than they 
might otherwise be because of the lack of efficient redistribution channels. Thus, failing to 
design an efficient means of redistributing the benefits may prevent some of the potential 
benefits from materializing. Designing income support policies that work well as both buffers 
against the volatility inherent in the global economy and as redistribution mechanisms for the 
gains from automation and globalization requires first considering how well current social 
assistance policies meet those goals.
Automation, globalization, and basic income
Recent studies document the tremendous impact of technology on jobs and skills, a sharp 
increase in income and wage inequality, and a drop in labor’s share in national income since 
the 1990s. In principle, both automation and globalization can bring universal gains. In 
practice, there are winners and losers—and just a few big winners but many more moderate 
to big losers (Spence, 2011; Standing, 2012; Sachs and Kotlikoff, 2012; Krugman, 2013; 
Hughes, 2014; Marchant et al., 2014). How large the benefits and costs are and how they 
are distributed depend on the redistribution mechanisms. Several studies have proposed 
unconditional basic income as the most appropriate mechanism for redistributing the 
benefits of automation and globalization (Standing, 2012; Krugman, 2013; Hughes, 2014). 
Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012) propose an intergenerational version of the universal basic income.
Sources: Hughes, J. J. “A strategic opening for a basic income guarantee in the global crisis 
created by AI, robots, desktop manufacturing and biomedicine.” Journal of Evolution and 
Technology 24:1 (2014): 45–61.
Krugman, P. “Sympathy for the Luddites.” The New York Times, June 13, 2013.
Marchant, G. E., Y. A. Stevens, and J. M. Hennessy. “Technology, unemployment & policy 
options: Navigating the transition to a better world.” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24:1 
(2014): 26–44.
Sachs, J. D., and L. J. Kotlikoff. Smart Machines and Long Term Misery. NBER Working Paper No. 
18629, 2012.
Spence, M. “Globalization and unemployment: The downside of integrating markets.” Foreign 
Affairs, July/August 2011.
Standing, G. “Responding to the crisis: Economic stabilization grants.” Policy & Politics 39:1 
(2012): 9–25.
DiSCUSSion oF PRoS AnD ConS
From welfare to workfare
There are several types of income maintenance policies, and the terminology used for them 
can be confusing. Guaranteed minimum income or minimum income guarantee policies 
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envisage transfers that guarantee a minimum level of income. The transfers may be subject 
to some selection criterion (for example, only single mothers under age 25) or condition 
(such as means testing or work requirements). If there are no selection criteria, the policy 
is described as universal, and if there are no conditions, it is described as unconditional. 
The negative income tax guarantees a minimum level of income, but the size of the transfer 
depends on the person’s own income (means testing). In some implementations, negative 
income tax-like mechanisms might include a work requirement (such as requiring a minimum 
number of hours of work). There are also non-means-tested transfers that are subject to 
behavioral conditions, such as sending children to school; these are referred to as conditional 
cash transfers. The unconditional basic income measure discussed here envisages an 
unconditional transfer. When unconditional basic income is also universal (given to every 
citizen), it is sometimes referred to as citizen income. Sometimes the qualifiers “universal” 
and “unconditional” are used equivalently.
Until the late 1990s and early 2000s, the social assistance policies of most industrialized 
countries were close to a (more or less generous) means-tested guaranteed minimum income, 
with a high implicit benefit reduction rate (the rate at which benefits are withdrawn as the 
recipient’s own earnings increase). In Figure 1(a), the heavy line represents the relationship 
between gross income and net available income under a conditional guaranteed minimum 
income policy. To keep things simple, the policy is depicted under the extreme hypothesis of 
a 100% benefit reduction rate (a €1 reduction in benefits for each additional euro of earnings 
until earnings reach G). Figure 1(a), again for simplicity, also assumes that a flat tax is applied 
to gross income exceeding G. Such mechanisms are known to weaken the incentives to work 
(a “poverty trap” effect, which prevents people from escaping poverty). In Figure 1(a), putting 
aside non-pecuniary motivations, there is no point in working for earnings below G, and 
there might be no point in working at all without the opportunity and the willingness to earn 
sufficiently more than G.
Automation, globalization, and the recession inflated the number of people in need of 
assistance and, in turn, the volume of social expenditure. Many industrialized countries 
Figure 1. Means-tested guaranteed minimum income
Source: Author’s own illustration.
Gross income
(a) With a 100% benefit reduction rate (b) With a less than 100% benefit
reduction rate
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responded by moving toward less protection, greater selectivity, and more sophisticated 
means testing and eligibility conditions: reducing guarantees, increasing work incentives 
(through tax credits, wage subsidies, and behavioral requirements as a condition for receiving 
benefits), and narrowing the segment of the population qualifying for income support. 
Figure 1(b) depicts a conditional guaranteed minimum income with a less than 100% 
benefit reduction rate—an incentive-augmented conditional guaranteed minimum income. 
Although such policies are useful for managing short-term income support programs and 
moderating poverty trap effects, they do not meet the goal of an efficient mechanism of 
global redistribution.
The policies actually implemented are much more complicated than the stylized versions in 
Figure 1(a) and (b). The typical means-tested and selective regimes are a chaotic overlapping 
of interventions that do not favor transparency or rational decision-making. These multiple 
measures may also increase monitoring and litigating costs and may open up opportunities 
for fraud and error.
Critical analyses of these policies point out that program designs with more sophisticated 
incentives and eligibility conditions do not completely overcome the deficiencies of means-
tested and conditional policies while introducing new problems [1], [2]. Incentive-augmented 
conditional minimum income policies do not eliminate the poverty trap. And they do not 
eliminate other problems, including take-up costs, stigma, and paternalism, that lead to low 
take-up rates and marginalization [3]. Programs focusing on wage subsidies or tax credits 
for low-income earners introduce additional distortions by favoring sectors that employ low-
wage workers [4].
An alternative: Unconditional basic income
An alternative policy might provide an unconditional basic income for everyone, as shown in 
Figure 2, where G now represents the unconditional benefit. For simplicity, as in Figure 1(a) 
and (b), income is taxed at a flat rate.
Figure 2. Unconditional basic income
Source: Author’s own illustration.
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Net income
G
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IZA World of Labor | February 2015 | wol.iza.org
5
Ugo Colombino  |  Is unconditional basic income a viable alternative to other social welfare 
measures?
Ugo Colombino  |  Is unconditional basic income a viable alternative to other social welfare 
measures?    World of Labor
Evidence-based policy making
   World of Labor
Evidence-based policy making
Benefits of an unconditional basic income policy
An unconditional basic income policy promises an efficient, flexible, and automatic 
mechanism for protecting against shocks and redistributing the benefits of automation and 
globalization. The idea of paying everyone an unconditional amount of money goes back to 
Thomas Payne’s pamphlet Agrarian Justice, which called for compensating the original “owners” 
of the commons (by definition, everyone), which had been expropriated when land holding 
became private. More generally, the returns from an efficiently exploited common resource 
should be (to some extent) distributed among the resource’s original owners. The gains from 
automation and globalization are similar to the returns from an efficiently exploited natural 
resource in that they introduce more efficient ways of producing and exchanging goods at the 
cost of “expropriating” the jobs and skills of the original stakeholders.
An unconditional basic income policy would respond automatically to the volatility and 
shocks inherent in the globalized economy [4]. Moreover, it would provide an efficient 
mechanism for reallocating jobs and resources in the globalized economy, where employers 
need flexibility to compete on a global scale and employees need support to redesign their 
careers and occupational choices. Studies find that a considerable number of recipients of 
unconditional cash transfers use the money to cover training in new skills and related costs 
of changing jobs. Economic theory suggests, and recent empirical analyses confirm, that 
unconditional basic income policies can eliminate poverty traps [5], [6].
According to US estimates, the administrative cost of a non-means-tested transfer such as 
an unconditional basic income is around 1–2%. Means testing boosts the cost to four or five 
times that amount. Means testing introduces obvious incentives for income underreporting 
and erroneous reporting, such as incorrect inclusions and exclusions. For example, the rate 
of overpayment due to fraud and error in the UK in 2010 is estimated at around 1% for non-
means-tested benefits and 4% for means-tested ones. Moreover, the costs (monetary and 
other) to recipients of means-tested transfers are substantial, as can be inferred from take-up 
rates well below 100% [3].
Challenges to implementing an unconditional basic income policy
Several arguments are presented against unconditional basic income. Chief among them 
is the claim that such policies also benefit the “undeserving.” That complaint is based on a 
false perception. While it is true that everyone is entitled to the same basic income benefit, 
taxation becomes progressive (even with a flat tax rate), so there is a level of gross income 
beyond which the benefit is exhausted: in Figure 2, it corresponds to the intersection of the 
heavy line with the dotted line, where gross and net income are equal.
Two other critical issues when considering unconditional basic income as an alternative to 
current policies are the cost and the effect on effort (labor supply, motivation), including the 
effect of the taxes required to pay for the benefit.
The gross cost of unconditional basic income is obviously large, although the precise cost 
depends on the size of the benefit. The net cost depends on whether unconditional basic 
income replaces other policies and to what extent, as well as on the size of the replaced 
expenditures. Where the social protection system is large (as in the Scandinavian countries), 
it might be possible to finance unconditional basic income simply by replacing current social 
assistance policies. In Mediterranean European countries, where expenditures on income 
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support are much smaller, replacing them would probably not be sufficient to cover the cost 
of an unconditional basic income transfer at a realistic level of benefits [5], [6].
Economic theory suggests that unconditional basic income might have a negative income 
effect on labor supply, as a higher disposable income for a given number of hours worked 
would induce people to supply less labor and to consume more leisure time. An unconditional 
basic income policy might also induce negative substitution effects—for example, if it is 
financed through higher marginal tax rates on income or wealth. The economic logic is that 
higher marginal tax rates mean lower net wage rates since the unit gain from one more hour 
of work declines, inducing people to work less than they otherwise would, again substituting 
leisure for work.
The evidence on the effects on effort is not conclusive, especially as implementation of 
unconditional basic income policies is limited (see Studies on unconditional basic income). 
Alaska is the only known case of widespread implementation of a redistribution policy that 
is analogous to an unconditional basic income measure, although the amount of the transfer 
is very small.
Studies on unconditional basic income
A 2014 paper provides detailed information and links on statewide implementations of 
a basic income measure in Alaska, local experiments in the 1970s in Canada and the US, 
and more recent experiments and pilot projects in India and countries in Africa and South 
America (Pasma, 2014). It also covers implementation and experiments for other policies that, 
although not strictly unconditional basic income measures, come close, such as conditional 
cash transfers and capital grants. A critical review of US experiments in the 1970s is provided 
by Widerquist (2005). A striking example of the positive incentives that can be activated by 
unconditional cash transfers is described in a paper on Uganda (Blattman et al., 2012).
Other studies describe natural experiments. A useful source of data for investigating the 
effects of exogenous changes in unearned income is lotteries and lottery winners (Imbens et 
al., 1999; Marx and Peeters, 2008).
Sources: Blattman, C., N. Fiala, and S. Martinez. Employment Generation in Rural Africa: Mid-Term 
Results from an Experimental Evaluation of the Youth Opportunities Program in Northern Uganda. DIW 
Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1201, 2012.
Imbens, G., D. Rubin, and B. Sacerdote. Estimating the Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Supply, 
Earnings, Savings and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery Players. NBER Working Paper 
No. 7001, 1999.
Marx, A., and H. Peeters. “An unconditional basic income and labor supply: Results from a 
pilot study of lottery winners.” The Journal of Socio-Economics 37:4 (2008): 1636–1659.
Pasma, C. Basic Income Programs and Pilots. Calgary: Basic Income Canada Network, 2014.
Widerquist, K. “A failure to communicate: What (if anything) can we learn from the negative 
income tax experiments?” Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 34:1 (2005): 49–81.
Empirical evidence on unconditional basic income policies
During the 1970s and 1980s, the findings of experiments on US social welfare programs are 
believed to have undermined the favorable attitudes toward universal social policies that 
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characterized the political and academic debate in the 1960s and early 1970s. More recently, 
however, new analyses suggest that the negative conclusions originally drawn from the data 
are based on improper interpretation of the findings or bad design of the experiments [7].
Recent experiments and pilot studies in India, Namibia, and Uganda reveal that universal 
and unconditional transfers, far from encouraging idleness, create positive incentives by 
strengthening recipients’ sense of autonomy and responsibility and by avoiding paternalism 
or stigma effects. Positive results include an increase in labor supply and productive activity 
and improvements in human capital (education, occupational choice, health). It remains to 
be seen whether similar results would emerge in industrial countries. The positive incentives 
created by these programs offer promise as well for easing the dramatic adjustments required 
by automation and globalization, which include a reallocation of labor and other resources. 
Mechanisms such as unconditional basic income can help people—financially and possibly 
motivationally—investing in new skills and search for jobs in new sectors.
Quasi-experimental studies have also been conducted. Lottery winners are ideal subjects 
for studying the effect of exogenous variation in unearned income on subsequent choices, 
particularly on labor supply decisions (see Studies on unconditional basic income).
Another approach is microsimulation (see behavioral microsimulation of benefit and tax 
reforms). A comprehensive behavioral microsimulation analysis of income support policies 
in Italy focuses on social welfare rather than labor supply [5], [6]. Besides Italy’s current policy 
(a set of categorical and strongly selective means-tested transfers), five types of reforms are 
evaluated: guaranteed minimum income, unconditional basic income, wage subsidy, and 
two mixed types, guaranteed minimum income plus wage subsidy and unconditional basic 
income plus wage subsidy. The simulations assume that the reforms are financed by canceling 
all current social assistance policies and, if necessary, proportionally increasing the current 
marginal tax rates on personal incomes above a certain threshold. The optimal policy turns 
out to be an unconditional basic income equal to 70–100% of the poverty line (depending 
on how equalitarian the social evaluation criterion is), requiring a top marginal tax rate of 
behavioral microsimulation of benefit and tax reforms
Behavioral microsimulation is used to predict the effects of reforms (such as changes to the 
benefit and tax systems) taking into account individual and household behavioral responses 
to changes in the economic environment. Behavioral microsimulation uses data sets 
containing detailed information on individual choices (e.g. work choices), constraints (prices, 
income), and personal characteristics of a large sample of individuals or households. Data 
are used to develop a statistical model that, given a certain configuration of constraints and 
personal characteristics, predicts (probabilistically) the choices individuals and households 
will make. This helps in evaluating tax and benefit reforms and identifying optimal tax and 
benefit systems (Aaberge and Colombino, 2013). Aaberge and Colombino (2014) provide a 
recent survey.
Sources: Aaberge, R., and U. Colombino. “Labour supply models.” In: O’Donoghue, C. (ed.). 
Handbook of Microsimulation Modelling. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2014.
Aaberge, R., and U. Colombino. “Using a microeconometric model of household labour 
supply to design optimal income taxes.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115:2 (2013): 448–
475.
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50–60%. These figures are high but not unrealistic. For example, in 2009 the top marginal tax 
rate was around 62% in Denmark and 57% in Sweden.
But even if such tax rates are judged infeasible, the menu of other welfare-improving 
reforms is large. For example, when combined with a flat tax instead of a progressive tax, 
the unconditional basic income (70% of the poverty line) would require a 42% flat rate. 
Moreover, alternative sources (wealth, consumption, externalities) of tax revenue could be 
considered. The effects on labor supply are negligible for men and modest for women. The 
unconditional basic income pays average benefits three times larger than the guaranteed 
minimum income, and yet the effect on hours worked is essentially the same because of the 
poverty-trap effects of the guaranteed minimum income. The substitution effect of higher 
taxes on high incomes is modest because estimated labor supply elasticities are essentially 
nil for high-income earners. While recent estimates of large elasticities of taxable income 
(rather than labor supply) among high-income earners received considerable attention, there 
is evidence suggesting that a large part of this response consists of tax evasion—relabeling 
income sources. This might be relevant for the public budget constraint but not for efficiency.
Other behavioral microsimulation exercises addressing unconditional basic income or related 
reforms have been performed for Australia, Canada, and Germany, [8], [9], [10]. For Canada 
and Germany, the focus of the studies is on labor supply effects; for Australia, the study 
also adopts a social welfare criterion, as in the analysis for Italy [5], [6]. The reduction in 
labor supply (for secondary workers) is found to be larger than in the Italian case. Besides 
differences in labor market institutions and possibly in preferences, differences in modeling 
approach may also explain some of the differences in labor supply effects. In any case, the 
negative effects on labor supply are serious enough to raise doubts about the viability of 
unconditional basic income-like policies. Yet, the Australian study reveals that unconditional 
basic income might be social welfare-enhancing despite the reduction in labor supply.
Understandably, concern about labor supply effects is central in a short-term perspective. 
However, in a longer-term perspective, the simple effects on hours of work and participation 
lose their prominence. A reduction in labor supply is precisely what one might (favorably) 
expect from a redistribution of the gains from automation and globalization. If automation 
increases output with less labor and if globalization pushes mature economies toward more 
advanced and labor-saving processes, the redistribution of the gains might indeed imply a 
reduction in (market-based) work. In practice, this means that when reforms are evaluated, 
evaluation criteria based only on changes in labor supply or income might be misleading in 
view of one of the main purposes of the reform itself. The value of time and resources allocated 
to non-labor market activities must be taken into account, as in [5] and [6]. Ultimately, the 
possibly negative impact on labor supply of unconditional basic income policies boils down 
to asking about how serious the trade-off is between efficiency and equality. At the macro 
level, econometric analyses find little evidence of a trade-off [11]. Moreover, behavioral 
microsimulation exercises show that some reforms and combinations of reforms are both 
efficiency- and equality-enhancing [12].
limiTATionS AnD gAPS
Economists have given much less attention to analyzing unconditional basic income than to 
policies such as tax credits or conditional cash transfers. Some experiments are being done 
in developing countries but not in developed countries (at least recently). Experiments are 
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important because they permit the direct identification of causal effects. The analysis of 
long-term dimensions of labor supply, such as education and occupation choices, would also 
benefit from experiments and the use of long-term panel data.
Still missing, except for a few individual estimates, is a systematic comparison of administrative 
costs (monitoring, delivery, litigation) of unconditional basic income compared with 
conditional or means-tested policies.
There is abundant—although not univocal—evidence of the substitution effects of income-
related taxes and benefits on labor supply. The evidence for income effects is more 
controversial and less robust. Yet, such evidence is crucial for comparing unconditional basic 
income with alternative policies. In addition, relatively little is known about the labor supply 
effects of taxing wealth rather than income.
SUmmARY AnD PoliCY ADViCE
The theoretical and empirical evidence is sufficient to suggest that unconditional basic 
income might be a viable alternative, or a complement, to selective and conditional social 
assistance policies. Unconditional basic income appears to be an especially sound approach 
for redistributing the gains from automation and globalization, by building an efficient and 
transparent buffer against global volatility and systemic risks, generating positive incentives, 
and avoiding recurrent risks of falling into poverty.
Compared with means-tested and conditional policies, unconditional basic income is likely 
to be a winner under most criteria used for comparison. A possible exception is the cost 
of an unconditional basic income policy (relative to the cost of means-tested policies) and 
the distortions that might be introduced by raising taxes to cover the cost of the program. 
Alternatives to progressive income taxation should be investigated, such as a flat tax, wealth 
tax, consumption taxes, or environmental taxes. There may also be room to combine 
unconditional and conditional benefits, to some degree, as in [5] and [6]. Along the same 
lines, cash transfers conditional on recipients taking certain education or health steps might 
represent an interesting and less extreme version of unconditional basic income.
Unconditional basic income policies could initially be introduced as a partial substitute for 
current means-tested and other conditional transfers, possibly limiting it to segments of the 
population identified on the basis of exogenous characteristics, such as age and gender.
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